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PROFIT FOR COSTS
Morris A. Ratner* & William B. Rubenstein†
Courts reward attorneys for investing time in class action lawsuits
more generously than they reward them for investing money in the
costs of those suits.  Class counsel may directly profit on time invest-
ments in two ways: by billing lawyers at market rates though paying
those lawyers less and by receiving multiplied fee awards.  Those
same attorneys in those same situations may also recover their costs
but courts may not—or at least do not—permit the attorneys either to
mark up their costs or to receive cost multipliers.  As cost profits are
rarely even debated, there is no good defense of why they are unavail-
able, but one assumes that courts are less comfortable awarding attor-
neys a markup on their copying machine than they are for their legal
work.
The assumption that costs cannot be directly profitable appears
therefore to belittle costs, relegating them to a secondary position in
the fee and cost award analysis and treating them as something of a
tagalong or afterthought.  Our goal in this Article is to give costs their
due.  We describe current jurisprudence, demonstrating how, given a
choice between investing profitable time or reimbursable costs, profit-
maximizing attorneys will find time investment more attractive than
cost investment.  We then explore the effects of this bias, showing that
because cost investments are not directly rewarded, profit-maximiz-
ing attorneys will predictably (1) avoid certain cases; (2) select subop-
timal modes of proceeding within cases they do bring; and then (3)
settle those cases prematurely.  Assuming that conclusion is unfortu-
nate, we consider and propose mechanisms for remedying it.
While our proposals are initial and therefore tentative, our commit-
ment to the project of centering costs is not:  it is grounded in the
belief that the legal system’s anti-cost-investment bias impedes access
to justice for individuals whose claims can be established only with
substantial cost investments by entrepreneurial lawyers.  Centering
costs—and considering measures as conventionally discouraged as
permitting third parties to profit from cost investments—has the po-
tential to serve a larger public good.
* Associate Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law.  The authors thank Brian
Fitzpatrick, Bill Wang, and John Crawford for helpful feedback; Kyla Gibboney and Christopher
McKinnon for research assistance; and Stephan Landsman and the other organizers of the 19th
Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law & Social Policy for inviting us to present this Article.
† Sidley Austin Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts reward attorneys for investing time in class action lawsuits
more generously than they reward attorneys for investing money in
the costs of those suits.  Class counsel may recover fees from an adver-
sary via a fee-shifting statute or from their clients under the common-
fund doctrine.  In both instances, the firm may profit in two ways: (1)
like any private firm, a class action firm can bill its attorneys’ time
investments at market rates that are likely higher than what it costs
the firm to pay and staff attorneys, meaning that the firm’s basic
“lodestar”1 embodies some profit for the firm’s partners; and (2) a
class action firm may also receive a multiplier on its lodestar to reward
it for the risk it took in pursuing a contingent fee case.  Those same
firms in those same situations may also recover their costs from the
same adversary or common fund, but courts may not—or at least do
not—permit the firms either to mark up their costs or to receive cost
multipliers.  As cost profits are rarely even debated, there is no good
defense of why they are unavailable, but one assumes that courts are
less comfortable awarding attorneys a markup on their copying ma-
chine than they are for their legal work.
The assumption that costs cannot be directly profitable appears
therefore to belittle costs, relegating them to a secondary position in
the fee- and cost-award analysis and treating them as something of a
tagalong or afterthought.  That approach usually comports with the
numbers, as costs are typically but a small fraction of fees.2  Perhaps
for these reasons, firms have rarely sought cost profits, and costs are
rarely a significant topic in fee jurisprudence or scholarship.
Our goal in this Article is to give costs their due.  Part II explains
how current jurisprudence defines and rewards costs and how those
rewards differ for fees, thus making time investment more attractive
than cost investment.  Part III explores the effects of this bias.  It dem-
onstrates that because cost investments are not directly rewarded,
profit-maximizing firms will predictably (1) avoid certain cases, (2) se-
lect suboptimal modes of proceeding within cases they do bring, and
then (3) settle those cases prematurely.  Part III thereby shows that
the current regime for reimbursing costs does not well serve the inter-
1. An attorney’s lodestar is the product of his reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the num-
ber of hours invested in a matter.  A firm’s lodestar is the sum of its attorneys’ lodestars attribu-
table to a case.
2. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action
Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 274 (2010) (“[In] 232 cases from 1993
to 2002 for which cost data were available, mean costs were 2.8 percent of the recovery and
median costs were 1.7 percent.”).
2014] PROFIT FOR COSTS 589
ests of class members or the public in certain types of (high cost)
cases; plaintiffs are less likely to be compensated and defendants less
likely to be deterred in high-recovery-cost, as opposed to low-recov-
ery-cost, situations.
Part IV assumes that Part III’s conclusion is unfortunate and thus
considers mechanisms for remedying it—that is, ways to encourage
private attorneys general to invest in cost-intensive cases.  We explore
the strengths and weaknesses of four distinct approaches to cost prof-
its: mark-to-market, cost-plus contracts, cost multipliers, and fee mul-
tipliers for cost investments.  Part IV demonstrates that devising a
reward regime for costs is more complicated than might be immedi-
ately apparent.  Nonetheless, enabling any profit on cost investments
will at least serve to dampen firms’ current disincentive to invest in
costs.  We therefore begin that process in Part V by suggesting a range
of possible first steps and by identifying and discussing some potential
negative consequences of such efforts.
One of those first steps posits that if costs could be profitable, the
legal system might permit nonlawyers to invest in them.  This is not an
Article about third-party financing per se, but we want to make two
gestures in that direction.  First, enabling firms to make a profit on
costs is a form of litigation financing, indeed a new one.  If cost profits
come out of a common fund, the funder would be the clients them-
selves; if cost profits were shifted, the funder would be the losing ad-
versary.  Whatever the mechanism for delivering the cost profit, that
profit alone would alter the class action litigation financing landscape.
Second, cost profits could also alter how third parties might be able to
invest in and profit from class action litigation.  Currently, the “profit”
a plaintiff’s attorney makes in a lawsuit is her marked-up and multi-
plied fee, and that profit cannot, consistent with ethical proscriptions,
be shared with nonlawyers.3  By contrast, if costs yielded profits, the
rule against fee-sharing might, arguably, not be violated were that
profit shared with a nonlawyer investor.  Even if cost profits were con-
sidered nonshareable “fees,” the reasons for not permitting an attor-
ney to share fees—the threat to her independence—might be
outweighed in these circumstances by the relatively small function
costs play compared to fees and the relative value to the class that
higher cost investments might engender.  In future work, we plan to
examine some of the ramifications that would follow from the oppor-
tunity for nonlawyers to invest money in the costs of cases and be
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2013) (“A lawyer or law firm shall not share
legal fees with a nonlawyer . . . .”).
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rewarded for successful investments.  For now, focusing on law firm
investments, we explore how enabling cost profits might funnel re-
sources to cases that are meritorious but presently underfunded,
thereby increasing access to justice.
II. DEFINING AND SITUATING COSTS
A. How Courts Define Costs
ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 (Opinion)4 divides attorney costs into
three categories: general overhead (e.g., office and utilities),5 dis-
bursements (e.g., expert fees and other payments to third parties),6
and in-house provision of services (e.g., copying and delivering).7  In-
terpreting ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5,8 the Opin-
ion discourages attorneys from directly profiting on these costs, absent
express agreement by the client to the contrary.  According to the
Opinion, clients appropriately assume that overhead is part of the law-
yer’s hourly rate and thus that it will not be billed separately.9  Simi-
larly, the Opinion states that clients reasonably expect disbursements
to be billed at no more than the amount the lawyer actually pays to a
third party, meaning that the lawyer should not mark up the cost and
should pass any discounts on to the client.10  Finally, the Opinion
holds that in-house services should, absent client consent, be billed at
actual cost plus a reasonable estimate of overhead directly attributa-
ble to the provision of the service.11  The majority of jurisdictions to
4. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993) elucidates ABA
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 (“Fees”), which has been widely adopted.
5. Id. at 7 (defining as “cost in maintaining a library, securing malpractice insurance, renting
of office space, purchasing utilities and the like”).
6. Id. (defining as items such as stenographer fees and travel expenses).
7. Id. at 8 (defining as items such as copy costs, in-house meals, and delivery services).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (“A lawyer shall not make an agreement for,
charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”).
9. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379, at 7 (“When a client
has engaged a lawyer to provide professional services for a fee . . . the client would be justifiably
disturbed if the lawyer submitted a bill to the client which included, beyond the professional fee,
additional charges for general office overhead.”).
10. Id. (“[C]lients justifiably should expect that the lawyer will be passing on to the client
those actual payments of funds made by the lawyer on the client’s behalf.”).
11. Id. at 8 (“[T]he lawyer is obligated to charge the client no more than the direct cost associ-
ated with the service (i.e., the actual cost of making a copy on the photocopy machine) plus a
reasonable allocation of overhead expenses directly associated with the provision of the service
(e.g., the salary of a photocopy machine operator). . . .  The lawyer’s stock in trade is the sale of
legal services, not photocopy paper, tuna fish sandwiches, computer time or messenger
services.”).
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have considered the ethics of cost profits track the ABA Opinion’s
categories and contractual approach.12
In a normal lawyer-client relationship, the contracting approach is
easy to effectuate: a retainer agreement typically sets forth the client’s
obligations with regard to payment of costs.  In a class action suit, such
ex ante contracting is usually impossible because the clients are prima-
rily absent class members, most of whom will be unaware of the exis-
tence of the suit prior to receiving notice of the certification of a
plaintiff class long after commencement of the proceedings.13  A court
must therefore approve the attorney’s fees and costs.  Though the
class action rule permits courts to include “provisions about the award
of attorney’s fees or nontaxable costs”14 in the order appointing class
counsel, courts more typically award fees and costs at the conclusion
of the lawsuit.15  In overseeing class action cost awards, courts have
developed a jurisprudence identifying reimbursable costs.  Specifi-
cally, reimbursable costs include all reasonable expenditures paid to
advance a successful class case,16 except for a firm’s overhead17 and its
12. Most jurisdictions have not issued ethics opinions traversing the same territory as ABA
Formal Op. 93-379, but have a tradition of looking to ABA ethics opinions for guidance in the
absence of local authority. See Lawrence K. Hellman, When “Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean What
They Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317,
324–25 (1996) (noting that state bars look to ABA ethics opinions for guidance).  Of the jurisdic-
tions that have issued relevant ethics opinions, most have followed the ABA’s contract ap-
proach. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 94-10
(1994) (permitting an attorney to contract with a client to charge a percentage of the fee as a
proxy for costs and in lieu of merely obtaining reimbursement for costs); State Bar of Mich.
Standing Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. RI-241 (1995) (permitting cost “surcharges” with client
consent); Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. No. 594 (2010) (permitting cost
profits with disclosure and consent); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 06-
02 (2006) (finding surcharge on particular expenses charged to client permissible with disclosure
and consent).
13. Securities class actions pursued under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.), are an exception; it would be interesting to review the extent to which lead plaintiffs
(typically institutional investors) in those cases bargain with lead counsel over costs ex ante, but
that project exceeds the scope of this Article.
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(D).
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
16. While Rule 23(h) authorizes an award of fees and “nontaxable” costs in a successful class
action, id., Rule 54(d)(1) authorizes courts to award “taxable” costs to a prevailing party in any
case—class action or not. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).  A federal statute defines such costs to
encompass items such as (1) fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) fees of the court reporter; (3) fees
and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification and copies of papers
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) docket fees; and (6) compensation of court ap-
pointed experts and interpreters.  28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006).
17. Overhead costs are presumed to be covered in any fee award. See In re Bausch & Lomb,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 78, 90 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The request for ‘word processing’ costs is
not only completely vague as to the nature or reason for those costs, but such costs are presumed
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professionals’ time.18  The remaining costs can be categorized using
ABA Formal Opinion 93-379’s taxonomy as either disbursements or
in-house services.  Typically, it is the former category of costs—pay-
ments made to third parties—that dominate class action counsel’s cost
submission.  That category picks up all of the major expenses in a class
suit, including the costs of electronic discovery, experts, special mas-
ters or mediators, class notice,19 and even litigation financing.20
B. How Courts Reward Costs
Courts are authorized to reimburse class counsel’s cost outlays in
one of two ways.  Some statutes entitle a prevailing party to payment
of its costs by its losing adversary; these statutes normally authorize
payment of all costs reasonably incurred to advance or resolve the
plaintiffs’ case, not just simple taxable costs.21  In cases in which coun-
sel’s effort has established a common fund, fees and costs are paid
from the fund to ensure that the fund beneficiaries are not unjustly
enriched by receiving counsel’s services without paying for them.22
The animating principle with regard to the award of costs in both fee-
to be included in counsel’s overhead expenses, and are thus properly included in the award of
attorneys’ fees.”).
18. Legal professionals’ time is excluded from costs because it is separately recoverable as
fees, but which legal professionals’ time may be included in the fee petition varies according to
the specific facts of the case, the relevant market, and task. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491
U.S. 274, 285, 287–88 (1989) (recognizing that law clerk and paralegal time should be included in
any fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 at market rates, rather than at the cost to the lawyer of
employing such persons, where it is the practice to bill in that manner to paying clients in the
relevant market); In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 131
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (“We have eliminated hours to the extent that paralegal time appeared to re-
present clerical work, such as messengering documents, opening mail, filing documents (in court
or out), etc.”).
19. Plaintiffs’ counsel must pay for notice programs, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 178 (1974), though if a case settles before the class is certified and provided certification
notice, the defendant typically pays the costs of settlement notice. See 3 WILLIAM B. RUBEN-
STEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:34, at 335 (5th ed. 2013).
20. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L.
REV. 377 (2014) (discussing the treatment of litigation financing costs).
21. See 1 ALBA CONTE, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS § 4:41, at 645–46 (3d ed. 2004) (“[I]t is
generally recognized that awards for litigation costs under a statutory fee authorization provision
are not limited to taxable costs for suits generally, but include all reasonable expenses incurred
in furnishing effective and competent representation.”).
22. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (stating that “[t]he doctrine
rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to
its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense”); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 393–94 (1970) (authorizing federal courts to award attorneys’ fees to prevent un-
just enrichment when litigation confers “a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertaina-
ble class, and where the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an
award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among them”); Sprague v. Ticonic
Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (“Plainly the foundation for the historic practice of granting
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shifting and common-fund cases is reasonableness, informed in part
by market principles (i.e., what fee-paying clients normally pay).23
Courts are rarely asked to approve, and even more rarely do approve,
any profit on costs, as discussed more fully below.
For our purposes, reimbursement of costs must be contrasted with
the manner in which courts award class counsel fees.  As with costs,
courts are authorized to award counsel fees either by a fee-shifting
statute24 or under the common-fund doctrine.25  In fee-shifting cases,
courts generally employ a lodestar method, awarding counsel an
hourly fee for all hours reasonably expended on the litigation;26 the
hourly rate is usually that of the local market.27  Courts have the dis-
cretion to multiply the fee, either upward or downward, but the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the federal fee-shifting statutes has
severely restricted the ability of lawyers to recover a fee multiplier in
fee-shifting cases.28  In common-fund cases, fees are typically calcu-
lated using the percentage-of-fund method,29 with class counsel typi-
reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable costs is part of the
original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation.”).
23. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998) (“‘[A]ttorney’s fees
awards include those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily
charged to their clients.’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football
League, 887 F.2d 408, 416 (2d Cir. 1989))); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOV-
ERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. a (2000) (“The prohibition on unreasonable payment arrangements
is not limited to fees in a narrow sense.  It applies also to excessive disbursement or interest
charges or improper security interests.” (citation omitted)); CONTE, supra note 21, § 2:19, at
190–91 (noting that “[t]he prevailing view is that expenses are awarded in addition to the fee
percentage” in common-fund cases); id. § 4:42, at 663 (“Recoveries of reasonable litigation costs
not limited to taxable costs are treated using the same standards for cost reimbursement in both
statutory and common fund fee award proceedings.”).
24. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (stating that in cases enforcing certain federal statu-
tory rights, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”).
25. See supra note 22.
26. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1672 (2010) (noting that the “‘lode-
star’ figure has, as its name suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence”
(quoting City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
27. See ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE SHEEHEY, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AWARDING ATTORNEYS’
FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION 20–21 (2d ed. 2005) (“Most courts consider the forum
community the proper yardstick, so an award for out-of-town counsel will not be based on the
rates in their usual place of work.”).
28. See, e.g., Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1669 (noting the “strong presumption” that lodestar is the
reasonable fee in fee-shifting cases).
29. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 14.121, at 187 (2004) (“After a
period of experimentation with the lodestar method . . . the vast majority of courts of appeals
now permit or direct district courts to use the percentage-fee method in common-fund cases.”
(footnotes omitted)); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and
Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 832 (2010) (finding that 69% of courts
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cally recovering roughly 20%–30% of the fund,30 mimicking the
familiar 33% contingency fee of individual plaintiffs’ counsel.  That
percentage need not have a relationship to the actual time the attor-
neys put into the case, but in roughly half the cases in which courts use
the percentage method, they undertake a “lodestar cross-check” of
the percentage award31 whereby they evaluate the fee in terms of the
hours the lawyers invested in the case and their hourly rate.  Through
the cross-check, a court can determine whether, and to what extent,
the requested percentage is a positive or negative multiple of the lode-
star.  In both settings, courts attempt to keep fees reasonable by test-
ing them against a series of factors that are derived from, and parallel,
the indicia for reasonable fees found in ethics rules.32
It may not be immediately obvious how costs and fees are treated
differently in that costs are reimbursed and fees are generally paid at
their market rate.  But the courts’ approach embodies two distinct lay-
ers of profits in fees but not costs.  First, a firm typically pays its law-
yers less than the market rate, such that the firm’s lodestar embodies a
profit for the firm’s partners.  This mimics the private market; indeed
the market rates in class action cases are generally borrowed from the
rates large firms bill their clients.  The partners at such firms bill their
utilize the percentage-of-fund method in some fashion, either with or without the lodestar cross-
check).
30. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS AC-
TIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES 69 (1996) (reporting median fee awards in class actions “rang[ing] from 27% to
30%”); see also Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 260 tbl.4 (mean award 24%; median award
25%); Fitzpatrick, supra note 29, at 835 tbl.8 (mean award 25.7%; median award 25%).
31. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 267 tbl.10 (showing that from 2003–2008, 42.8%
of courts used both the percentage and lodestar methods in the same case, suggesting that these
courts are undertaking a lodestar cross-check).
32. Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974)
(articulating a twelve-factor test for fee reasonableness: “(1) The time and labor required;”; “(2)
The novelty and difficulty of the questions”; “(3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly”; “(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the
case”; “(5) The customary fee”; “(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent”; “(7) Time limita-
tions imposed by the client or the circumstances”; “(8) The amount involved and the results
obtained”; “(9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys”; “(10) The [political]
‘undesirability’ of the case”; “(11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client”; and “(12) Awards in similar cases”), with, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.5(a) (2013) (“The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include
the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if appar-
ent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal ser-
vices; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the
client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the ser-
vices; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”).
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clients market rates, pay their associates at lower than market rates,
and pocket the difference.  So too can a partner at a class action firm
awarded the firm’s lodestar.  Second, as noted above, court-awarded
fees may include a positive multiplier, particularly in common-fund
cases.  Fee multipliers acknowledge the risk that contingent fee plain-
tiffs’ counsel undertook.  If contingent fee counsel were merely reim-
bursed at market rates, few would undertake such work because they
could get paid market rates in noncontingent fee cases without such
risk.33  By rewarding the risk that counsel took, the multiplier incen-
tivizes the lawyer to pursue a contingent practice.
Neither of these profit centers is available on the cost side, at least
not directly.  As discussed earlier, ABA Model Rule 1.5 and a related
ethics Opinion discourage lawyers from profiting on costs, though
some reasonable profit on disbursements and in-house service charges
may be negotiated as part of an ex ante representation and fee agree-
ment.34  Courts overseeing class actions have generally refused to per-
mit cost markups, typically relying on the fact that the class does not
have the opportunity to negotiate the charges ex ante.35  Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, there is no such thing as a “cost multiplier”; no re-
33. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.9, at 567 (4th ed. 1992) (“A
contingent fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed.
The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the
loan of those services.  The implicit interest rate on such a loan is high because the risk of default
(the loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that
of conventional loans . . . .”); see also John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee
Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 480 (1981) (“A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and
provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the
second of these functions.  If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept
fee award cases.”).
34. See supra Part II.A.
35. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 237 (1st Cir. 1997)
(“Unlike the PSC, the IRPAs [individually retained plaintiffs’ attorneys] are free to assess their
own clients for photocopying in accordance with their respective contingent fee agreements and
any applicable ethical-code provision.  On the other hand, the PSC is a creature of the district
court, whose mission is to promote more efficient litigation.  In a ‘common benefit’ case of this
sort, therefore, the court must ensure that PSC members recover only their actual costs, with no
‘profit’ margin.” (citation omitted)); In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 779 F. Supp.
1063, 1111–12 (D. Ariz. 1990) (“A further deduction will be made to the amounts reported by
Bernstein Litowitz, as it will be made for most other firms, for the expense of photocopying.
Initially, the firm imposed a charge of 15 cents per page for in-house copies.  The charge in-
creased in January 1987 to 20 cents, and again in March 1989 to 25 cents.  The Court considers
the per-page charges, and the resulting $44,200 assessment to Class members, excessive.  That
this amount may be charged to regular clients by the firm, or that it is ‘standard’ in the firm’s
area of practice, is not controlling.  Class members will not be assessed an amount that produces
a clear and unwarranted profit for the firm.  While it is not possible—either for the Court or
counsel—to establish a ‘true’ cost for photocopying in this action, a reasonable allowance of
approximately $26,500 for in-house copying expense of Bernstein Litowitz will be permitted.”
(footnote omitted)), vacated in part, 19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994).
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ported court decision has ever awarded counsel a cost that was
directly multiplied.
It is true, as noted above, that fees may be multiplied based on the
risks counsel took in pursuing a case, and such profit-making risk may
include risks arising from cost investments:  courts have held in both
statutory fee-shifting36 and common-fund cases37 that attorneys can
demonstrate risk by, inter alia, showing an extraordinary outlay of
costs.  In this sense, cost outlays may be a factor in fee profits, but this
indirect reward for cost investments is clumsy, at best, and detracts
little from the conclusion that costs are reimbursed but not rewarded.
Similarly, firms working together to pursue a case sometimes con-
tract to reward cost investments in ways that the courts do not by
reallocating fee payments to cost investors.38  For instance, an agree-
ment that surfaced in one case stated that “35% of any class fees
would be allocated according to costs advanced and 65% would be
allocated based on work performed.”39  Such an agreement may be
penned ex ante,40 or at the time that counsel negotiate adding new
firms or cost investments,41 or even ex post, after a court awards an
aggregate fee.42  This type of private ordering demonstrates the in-
36. See, e.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1674 (2010) (holding, in inter-
preting federal fee statute, that where expense outlays are “extraordinary” and the litigation is
“exceptionally protracted,” a fee multiplier may be appropriate).
37. See, e.g., Edelman & Combs v. Law, 663 So. 2d 957, 959–60 (Ala. 1995) (listing “the rea-
sonable expenses incurred by the attorney” as one of the relevant fee factors in common-fund
fee situations); Ladewig v. Ariz. Dept. of Revenue, 63 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Ariz. Tax Ct. 2003)
(stating, in a common fund case, that “the risk undertaken by counsel, the fact that they ad-
vanced approximately $246,815.00 in costs on behalf of the class, and the fact that their award of
attorneys’ fees has been delayed for almost twelve (12) years warrants that they be given a
reasonable incentive for their efforts”).
38. See Vincent Robert Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 539, 579 (1988) (identifying intra-class counsel fee reallocation
agreements as one flawed but “plausible means of minimizing the risk of undercompensation of
the cost of advancing class action expenses”).
39. Dunn v. Dart, No. 09 CVS 02600, 2011 WL 2749569, at *4 n.14 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 14,
2011).
40. See, e.g., Ex parte Burr & Forman, LLP., 5 So. 3d 557, 559 (Ala. 2008) (reciting fee and
cost sharing agreement terms reached by participating counsel at outset of litigation, requiring
counsel to bear common costs in proportion to anticipated fee split, though with a cap on cost
contributions to be made by firms receiving the smaller percentage fees); Daniel v. Aon Corp.,
952 N.E.2d 638 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (dispute arising out of alleged fee allocation agreement
among cooperating class counsel discussed at the outset of the litigation, prior to any fee award).
41. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1987) (“In
December of 1983, as a means of raising the capital necessary for the maintenance and continua-
tion of the lawsuit, the nine PMC members entered into a written fee sharing agreement
whereby six of the members each promised to advance the class $200,000 for general litigation
expenses.”).
42. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., No. 21 MC 92(SAS), 2011 WL 2732563, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2011) (counsel tasked with recommending an allocation of an aggregate fee
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stinct to reward cost investments, but standing alone it does not actu-
ally do so; the court has not awarded any extra money for the cost
investment—the attorneys have simply reallocated the fixed fee award
among themselves in a manner not purely based on their time invest-
ments.  Worse, such private reordering is useful only in cases that at-
tract multiple law firms with varying preferences or capacities
regarding the investment of time and costs, and moreover is useful
only to the extent that courts will enforce these agreements, but they
need not and often do not do so.43  Courts generally do not like these
inter-firm agreements because they run afoul of the default preference
for allocating according to the services rendered (i.e., the attorneys’
relative lodestars)44 and raise other ethical concerns.  For example, in
the seminal case on point—In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability
Litigation45—the Second Circuit, while not finding such a contract per
se unenforceable, identified three interrelated concerns rendering
such contracts effectively unusable: (1) that the contract deviated sub-
stantially from the lodestar,46 (2) that it created a conflict of interest
award post-settlement considered, among other factors, “whether the firm met its litigation fund
obligations,” as well as factors pertaining more to investment of attorney time, such as whether
the attorneys assumed “supervisory responsibilities or other leadership roles”).
43. See, e.g., In re High Sulfur Content Gasoline Prods. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 220, 230 (5th Cir.
2008) (“This circuit . . . does not forbid a district court to rely on fee allocation proposals submit-
ted by attorneys.  The proposals must, however, be factually supportable and consistent with the
Johnson [v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)] factors.”); In re FPI/
Agretech Sec. Litig., 105 F.3d 469, 474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We decline to curb the district courts’
broad discretion in exercising their equitable power to award attorneys’ fees in common fund
class actions by requiring that fee allocation proposals be treated as enforceable contracts.”);
Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1225 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“[A] federal
court always has authority to reject agreements allocating fees among class counsel whenever
there is cause to do so.”).
44. See, e.g., In re FPI/Agretech Sec. Litig., 105 F.3d at 473 (“[A] court may reject a fee alloca-
tion agreement where it finds that the agreement rewards an attorney in disproportion to the
benefits that attorney conferred upon the class—even if the allocation in fact has no impact on
the class.”); Prandini v. Nat’l Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1977) (“A division of fees [by
agreement among counsel] based on a percentage without regard to work performed or respon-
sibility assumed is not in compliance with the standard.  Consequently, when he was asked to
approve a fee based only upon the percentage agreement, the trial judge properly refused to
approve the arrangement.”); Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 598, 612
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“To the extent that counsel’s fee-sharing agreement differs significantly from
the lodestar or from the amount that the court determines is equitable after adjusting each attor-
ney’s lodestar, the court may refuse to enforce the attorney’s arrangement.”).
45. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216.  For an overview of the circum-
stances leading to the funding crisis in Agent Orange, see PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE
ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 107–09 (1986); Paula Batt Wilson, Note,
Attorney Investment in Class Action Litigation: The Agent Orange Example, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 291, 311–13 (1994).
46. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 223 (“[W]hile the practice of
allowing class counsel to distribute a general fee award in an equitable fund case among them-
selves pursuant to a fee sharing agreement is unexceptional, we find that any such agreement
598 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:587
between class counsel and the class,47 and (3) that it undermined the
court’s role as the class’s fiduciary.48  While fees law has developed
significantly in the quarter century since the Second Circuit’s Agent
Orange decision, and in ways that might be more receptive to the en-
forcement of contracts rewarding cost investments,49 neither class
counsel nor courts have pursued this agenda.  What this review has
demonstrated is that fees can generate partner profits while costs gen-
erally cannot, or at least do not, perform the same magic.
C. How Firms Approach Costs
Given a jurisprudence that enables profit on time but not costs, one
would expect firms to prefer time over cost investment, just as a con-
sumer would, all else being equal, prefer an interest-bearing checking
account over a non-interest-bearing checking account.  That proposi-
tion and our exploration of cost effects in the succeeding sections rest
on three key assumptions.  First, consistent with a classic model of
attorney case investment decision making,50 we assume law firms and
must comport essentially with those principles of fee distribution set forth in Grinnell I and
Grinnell II.”).
47. Id. at 223–24 (“In our view, fees that include a return on investment present the clear
potential for a conflict of interest between class counsel and those whom they have undertaken
to represent,” due to the “incentive provided to an investor-attorney to settle early and thereby
avoid work for which full payment may not be authorized by the district court.”).  In rejecting
the idea that the lawyers of the PMC could be equated with an ad hoc firm for purposes of
applying ethics rules, the court seemed, too, to implicitly accept arguments regarding ethics-
based limits on divisions of fees among lawyers from distinct firms. Id. at 226.
48. Id. at 223 (“There is authority for a court, under certain circumstances, to award a lump
sum fee to class counsel in an equitable fund action under the lodestar approach and then to
permit counsel to divide this lodestar-based fee among themselves under the terms of a private
fee sharing agreement.  We reject this authority, however, to the extent it allows counsel to
divide the award among themselves in any manner they deem satisfactory under a private fee
sharing agreement.  Such a division overlooks the district court’s role as protector of class inter-
ests . . . and its role of assuring reasonableness in the awarding of fees in equitable fund cases.”
(citations omitted)).
49. The most significant development since Agent Orange is the shift across jurisdictions from
a strong preference for the lodestar method to acceptance of the percentage method in common-
fund cases. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 14.121, at 187 (2004) (“After a
period of experimentation with the lodestar method . . . , the vast majority of courts of appeals
now permit or direct district courts to use the percentage-fee method in common-fund cases.”
(footnotes omitted)).  As fees law is now less firmly fixated with lodestar awards, courts might be
more understanding of contracts that deviate from lodestar-based allocations among counsel.
50. See generally Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J. B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the
Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970).  The Schwartz and
Mitchell article provided the basis of the modeling done in another classic work, Kevin M. Cler-
mont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 534 n.10,
537–46 (1978).  A variation of that same model grounded Professor John Coffee’s early scholar-
ship regarding the case investment and settlement strategies of private attorneys general. John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Pri-
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the individual lawyers associated with them are cohesively and ration-
ally profit maximizing51 and function as “risk-taking entrepreneurs.”52
Second, we assume that when choosing whether to pursue litigation,
firms can discern, at the outset, the extent to which a case will involve
the investment of time and costs, as well as the reward the firm is
likely to reap from that investment.53  Third, we assume law firms are
indifferent between the investment of time and money in litigation, if
time and money investments yield the same reward.
None of these assumptions perfectly captures real firm behavior.
Firms often honor a host of values other than profit maximization;54
firms can often only make crude estimates of litigation costs at the
outset of a case; and not all firms are indifferent as to investment of
time and costs, given constraints such as limited access to capital or
the time demands of the firm’s existing case portfolio.  Nevertheless,
our assumptions are helpful for modeling purposes.55  The hypotheti-
vate Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 687
n.55 (1986).  None of these analyses specifically focused on cost rewards or investment.
51. To simplify our analysis, we assume, further, that if multiple firms join forces to litigate a
class action, they act as a single firm pursuing the same case to maximize the rewards to the
participating firms as a whole.  This assumption, like the assumption of intra-firm cohesiveness,
allows us to avoid accounting for the effects of group dynamics on firms’ case investment deci-
sions.  While those dynamics are important, see Morris Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class
Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757 (2012) (examining incentive effects of firm organizational
structure on case investment and settlement decisions by individual lawyers within firms), we
bracket them here to enable this initial analysis of cost profits. This same cluster of assumptions
enables us to use the terms “attorneys” and “firms” interchangeably in this Article when refer-
ring to class counsel’s case investment incentives and choices.
52. See Coffee, supra note 50, at 676 (“Once we understand that the plaintiff’s attorney in
these actions behaves as a risk-taking entrepreneur, there are reasons to believe that the private
incentives for much litigation may be inadequate from a social cost perspective.”); see also Ken-
neth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 47, 60 (1975) (“The [class action] attorney is an entrepreneur.”).
53. Relatedly, we assume that firms treat their time investments as if they were to be re-
warded on a lodestar basis, even if in fact a court will use a straight percentage fee award.  If
counsel could rely on a pure percentage fee (without a lodestar cross-check) in every case some
of the disparity between time and capital investments would be muted, as any investment would
centrally contribute to recoupment of the percentage award in this or another case.  Our as-
sumption that attorneys focus on lodestar is generally warranted, however, in that attorneys
making ex ante investment decisions often do not know if the court will use a pure percentage-
of-fund method or will instead utilize a lodestar approach, or a lodestar cross-check, given that
courts generally make such decisions ex post, at the time of any settlement or judgment.
54. See Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 251 (1985) (using empirical data to cast doubt on the explanatory power of eco-
nomic models that attempt to predict or explain lawyer case investment choices on the assump-
tion that lawyers are profit-maximizing).
55. Cf. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 50, at 1127 (“This Article assumes throughout that
both lawyer and client are rational, economic men.  No account is taken of professional pride,
ethics, or a desire ‘to keep the insurance company honest.’  No one can know to what extent
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cal case investment scenarios we explore in the following Part tell us
something useful, even if real life is more complicated.
III. EXPLORING COST EFFECTS
Having defined costs and fees and described how courts treat them
differently, we are ready to model the distortions created by that dif-
ferential treatment.  Specifically, the differential rewards flowing from
time and cost outlays distort attorney case selection, management, and
settlement decisions in predictable ways.56
A. High-Cost Cases Are Less Likely to Be Pursued
A typical class action firm will have limited resources—given its
current caseload and access to both attorney time and capital—to in-
vest in new cases.  Assume the firm is considering involvement in two
cases with similar risks (in terms of success), each of which involves
the same total outlay (combined outlay of lodestar plus costs) but in
different quantities.
Case 1: Total Outlay $1 million
At the outset of the case, the firm estimates it will spend $400,000
on causation experts and $400,000 on mailed notice in the event a
litigation class is certified.  The remaining $200,000 of the expected
outlay is attorney time, measured in lodestar (which translates into
500 hours of attorney time—or roughly 1/4 of a year’s total billing
for one busy lawyer—at $400 per hour).
Case 2: Total Outlay $1 million
At the outset of the case, the firm estimates it will spend $800,000 in
lodestar (which translates into 2,000 hours of attorney time—or
roughly one full year’s billings for one busy lawyer) on a case with
complex briefing and fact discovery.  The firm estimates it will
spend an additional $200,000 covering costs like expert fees and
notice.
As should be obvious, all other things being equal, a firm looking to
maximize its profit will pursue Case 2 rather than Case 1, as the bulk
of its investment may yield a profitable and potentially multiplied re-
covery.  Below, Table 1 shows that the firm’s yield is 50% greater in
Case 2 ($1,800,000) than in Case 1 ($1,200,000).
This comparison actually likely underestimates the benefit of Case 2
to the firm for another reason.  The hypothetical assumed a single law-
such factors affect lawyers’ behavior.  Their presence does not, however, negate the considera-
tion treated in the text—the lawyer’s behavior as an economic man.”).
56. In some sense, these are all variants of the same problem—namely, that an attorney will
always weigh investing her next dollar in a cost against the other available opportunities—
though they occur at different points in the litigation spectrum.
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TABLE 1: A COMPARISON OF INVESTMENT RETURNS IN
TWO SIMPLE CASES
Case 1 Case 2
Investment Return Investment Return
Fees (2 multiplier) $200,000 $400,000 $800,000 $1,600,000
Costs $800,000 $800,000 $200,000 $200,000
Total $1,000,000 $1,200,000 $1,000,000 $1,800,000
yer billed at $400 per hour.  In 2,000 hours—or one year—of billing
this lawyer to the class, the firm generates an unmultiplied lodestar of
$800,000.  However, the firm is likely paying that lawyer less than that
amount,57 even assuming that the fee encompasses the lawyer’s over-
head and benefits.
Table 1A shows that if the firm bills its attorneys at 33% more than
it costs the firm to hire, train, pay, and house those attorneys, its ac-
tual investment is less than that shown in Table 1, and yet the return
on that investment remains that which is shown in Table 1 and is
therefore a greater actual return.  Moreover, the disparity between
the cost-heavy case and fee-heavy case widens: the cost-heavy case
now requires an investment of $950,000 (rather than $1,000,000), yet
the fee-heavy case requires an investment of only $800,000 (rather
than $1,000,000), with the returns remaining the same.  The cost-heavy
case had a 20% return on investment absent the lodestar profit and
has a 26% return with it; the fee-heavy case had an 80% return on
investment absent the lodestar profit and has a 125% return with it.
TABLE 1A: A COMPARISON OF INVESTMENT RETURNS IN
TWO SIMPLE CASES
Case 1 Case 2
Investment Return Investment Return
Fees $150,000 (actual) $400,000 $600,000 (actual) $1,600,000
(2 multiplier) $200,000 (billed) $800,000 (billed)
Costs $800,000 $800,000 $200,000 $200,000
Total $950,000 $1,200,000 $800,000 $1,800,000
In short, investments in fees may be profitable at lodestar alone, and
hence the profit in the multiplier is simply gravy.
57. $400 per hour is roughly the billing rate of a fifth-year associate in the Los Angeles market
and the cost of paying and staffing a fifth-year associate is likely less than $800,000 per year.
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The discussion to this point has assumed that the firm was equally
likely to prevail in either case.  However, given the bonus for prevail-
ing in a fee-heavy case, a rational firm would pursue a riskier fee-
heavy case rather than a low risk cost-heavy case.  In the hypothetical
above, if the fee-heavy case had a 67% chance of winning, but a 2
multiplier if the plaintiffs did succeed, its net expected value at the
outset (.67 × $1,800,000) would be precisely the same as the cost-
heavy case with an assured victory and a 2 multiplier.58
It is, of course, easy to devise a hypothetical case that shows the
dramatic effect of fees but not costs being multiplied.  The tougher
question is whether any real cases actually have these characteristics.
The matched sets of cases in Table 2 demonstrate some of the ways
these effects might play out in a variety of substantive law settings,
assuming again that the cases in each row have the same expected
value and differ only in the mix of time and cost investment necessary
to prosecute them.
TABLE 2: THE ACTUAL CASE-SELECTION EFFECTS OF NOT
MULTIPLYING COSTS
Case 2 – High Costs Case 1 – Low Costs
Property Damage A property damage case requiring A property damage environmental
plume studies and expert analysis case involving a single, known
to trace the source of point source (e.g., a factory that is
contamination from possible point the only entity within a particular
sources to a particular parcel or distance known to have used or
grouping of properties. produced a particular
contaminant).
Personal Injury A personal injury cancer-cluster A case involving less severe
case involving a community personal injuries on behalf of
exposed to multiple known and long-term workers at a single
suspected carcinogens from a plant or factory exposed to a
variety of possible defendants. single known contaminant.
Fraud A case alleging fraud in the billing A case alleging fraud in the billing
of uninsured patients against a of uninsured patients against a
hospital chain that includes hospital chain that has a single
recently acquired hospitals with billing system and that consistently
disparate billing systems and engaged in fraud as to only one
practices, and a range of alleged category of billing.
illicit charges requiring a review of
a broader array of medical records
to document the charges.
58. In fact, the argument for a 2 multiplier would be greater in the riskier case than in the safe
case, skewing the analysis further.
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Invasion of A case alleging that a national A case alleging that an Internet
Privacy bank errantly released its company errantly released
electronic records of past information in electronic records
customers’ safe deposit about current e-mail users; any
information; any court-required court-required notice in the case
notice in the case would need to could be accomplished via e-mail.
be done by first-class mail,
perhaps augmented with a
national advertising campaign.
In sum, a firm considering investing in two cases, one involving high
costs and low attorney time and the other involving relatively low
costs and high attorney time, will invest in the latter case because the
possibilities of fee profits and fee multipliers—with no possibility of
profiting from costs—makes the investment much more attractive.
This means that a set of high-costs cases will likely not be pursued,
even if the odds of prevailing are similar.59  Moreover, given the dis-
parity in returns, it is likely that a firm would invest in many less wor-
thy fee-heavy cases.
B. Cases That Are Pursued May Be Pursued Suboptimally
Once the case is filed, investment of attorney time will logically be
more attractive than investment of cash for costs because time is mul-
tipliable while costs are not.  Litigation incentives may thus be dis-
torted.  A critical example of this is the use of legal process
outsourcing vendors (LPOs).60  There are certain functions that
nonlawyers under the supervision of a lawyer may perform in a class
suit, such as work coding and searching discovery documents.  A cost-
conscious firm could outsource these tasks to an LPO, perhaps even
one in another country where the labor costs are lower than in the
59. There may be additional benefits to pursuing high cost cases that our analysis does not
capture.  For example, we do not account for the effects of competition among law firms for
position in cases, which may prompt firms able to fund higher cost litigation to pursue it, know-
ing such cases will present less crowded fields of plaintiffs’ firms jockeying for position (and thus
for the opportunity to control the allocation of work and the fees that flow from leadership and
work).
60. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451, at 1–2 (2008)
(“Many lawyers engage other lawyers or nonlawyers, as independent contractors, directly or
through intermediaries, on a temporary or an ongoing basis, to provide various legal and nonle-
gal support services.  Outsourced tasks range from the use of a local photocopy shop for the
reproduction of documents, to the retention of a document management company for the crea-
tion and maintenance of a database for complex litigation, to the use of a third-party vendor to
provide and maintain a law firm’s computer system, to the hiring of a legal research service to
prepare a 50-state survey of the law on an issue of importance to a client, or even to the engage-
ment of a group of foreign lawyers to draft patent applications or develop legal strategies and
prepare motion papers in U.S. litigation.  The outsourcing trend is a salutary one for our global-
ized economy.  Labor costs vary greatly across the United States and throughout the rest of the
world.  Outsourcing affords lawyers the ability to reduce their costs and often the cost to the
client . . . .”).
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United States.  Yet the disparate treatment of fees and costs rewards
the use of attorney time and provides a disincentive to choose nonlaw-
yer providers of services.  Table 3 demonstrates this by comparing the
costs and returns of three options: (1) outsourcing the work to an
LPO, paying for it on a flat fee basis, and using a small amount of
attorney time to supervise the LPO; (2) hiring contract lawyers to per-
form the work with negligible supervision; and (3) having a staff attor-
ney perform the work.
TABLE 3: COSTS AND RETURNS ON LAWYERS VS. LPOS
Option 1 – LPO Option 2 – Option 3 –
Contract Attorney Staff Attorney
Cost to Firm $25,000 flat fee $25,000 $50,000
+ (1,000 hours at (1,000 hours at
$5,000 attorney time $25 per hour) $50 per hour)
(100 hours at $50
per hour)
= $30,000
Costs Billed to Class $25,000 $0 $0
Lawyer Billed to Class $32,500 fees $225,000 $325,000
(2 multiplier) (100 hours at $325 (1,000 hours at (1,000 hours at
per hour) $225 per hour) $325 per hour)
× 2 × 2 × 2
= $65,000 = $450,000 = $650,000
Total Paid by Class $90,000 $450,000 $650,000
Net Profit $60,000 $425,000 $600,000
Table 3 shows that class action firms have little incentive to out-
source work to less costly LPOs; the firm will realize a profit utilizing
either contract attorneys or staff attorneys, while the only profit avail-
able in the use of LPOs is that of the time of the attorney supervising
the LPO.  This hurts the class in two ways, one micro and one macro.
In a particular case, it drives the class’s recovery down, as the attor-
neys’ extra lodestar justifies a higher fee; with each dollar of the fee
coming out of the class’s returns, the class’s recovery is thereby dimin-
ished.  More globally, it skews resources toward cases where lawyers
can run up their time and away from cases that could be easily han-
dled by nonlawyers.  This effect may be diminished by counsel’s risk
factor—if the case is a risky one, a risk-averse lawyer may take the
cheaper route, even if her return is less, so as to hedge her bets.  How-
ever, for that very reason, attorneys are likely to gravitate towards less
risky cases—for example, following government enforcement actions
or investing in pharmaceutical cases after the FDA has removed a
drug from the market—and then run up their time in those cases.
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The LPO example is not an isolated one.  The incentive to steer
nonlawyer work to lawyers affects a variety of litigation investment
choices.  For example, the disparity in rewards on time and cost in-
vestment may prompt lawyers to:
• Review medical records that would be better screened by medi-
cal professionals in the first instance;
• Handle routine client contacts that nonlawyer professionals
could cost-effectively handle; or
• Respond to routine questions arising out of class notice pro-
grams that third-party notice vendors could more efficiently
handle.61
C. Cases May Be Settled Prematurely
Because attorneys receive relatively little reward for their cost in-
vestments, they may be tempted to settle cases on the eve of such
investment points.  For example, a firm may:
• Work a case through motion practice, but settle before investing
significantly in outside experts;
• Avoid or defer moving for class certification, although such cer-
tification would give it settlement leverage, if it were going to be
required to pay the costs of notice of a litigation class—costs
that would normally be shouldered by the defendant in the
event of a settlement; or
• Pursue a case to the point of trial but settle before investing sig-
nificantly in such a trial.
A rich literature demonstrates how fee structures create incentives
for class counsel to settle prematurely.62  This well-chronicled agency
61. To some extent, courts may guard against efforts by counsel to pad their lodestar by hav-
ing lawyers perform administrative or other “nonlawyer” tasks by reducing the billing rate or
number of hours billed, especially in lodestar cases where the attorney hours are more carefully
scrutinized. See, e.g., Ryan v. Allied Interstate, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(reducing lodestar in a fee-shifting case on ground that attorneys engaged in less skilled work
that could have been performed by nonlawyers).  However, such oversight taxes limited court
resources, and for that reason may not be particularly effective. See Court Awarded Attorney
Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985) (identifying as two of several
deficiencies of the lodestar method first, that it consumes limited judicial resources by imposing
a time-intensive gatekeeping function, and second, that it encourages various forms of padding).
See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff As Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 35 (“If the defendant agrees not to
object to the plaintiff’s fee request, there is little prospect that the court will engage in an elabo-
rate inquiry into the reasonableness of the hours expended by the plaintiff’s attorney.”).
62. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 50, at 684–90; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Rec-
ommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22 (1991) (“Finally, consider incentive effects in
class and derivative litigation.  The lack of monitoring and the relative inefficacy of bonding in
these settings would not be especially problematic if the interests of plaintiffs’ counsel were
closely aligned with those of their clients.  Unfortunately, there is a substantial deviation of inter-
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problem has two principal facets, both flowing from the asymmetry
between the interests of class counsel and the class members.  First,
the lawyer has an incentive to invest too little in class litigation.  The
lawyer advances her time, but is entitled to only part of the class’s
return (i.e., whatever amount a court ultimately awards class counsel
as part of the fee award).63  Because fees are only a fraction of the
overall award, attorneys will predictably be inspired to invest time
only to the point where each additional hour of time produces a fee
that is equal to or greater than what the attorney can earn investing
her time in another venture.64  By contrast, the client prefers attorney
investment until the later point at which the marginal cost to the client
of additional investment (i.e., the lawyer’s fee) is no longer less than
the corresponding gain in settlement amount.65  Second, class actions
present an opportunity for plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel to col-
lude, trading settlement benefits for fees.  For example, if counsel’s
investment to date has produced a case value of $100 million, counsel
may be tempted to settle for a fraction of that amount in exchange for
ests between attorney and client.  The nature of the conflict varies depending on the type of
litigation involved and the procedure used in the jurisdiction for determining the attorney’s fee.
But at least under the existing regulatory system, the conflict remains significant in all cases.”).
63. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 50, at 544–45 (“The lawyer once again has economic
interests very different from his client’s.  For each hour the lawyer devotes to the case, he re-
ceives 1/3 of any increase in the settlement resulting from that hour’s work.  However, for that
hour he must forgo working an hour on some other matter, at an opportunity cost of $50.  His
interests suggest that he should continue to devote hours to this case only so long as each addi-
tional hour increases his fee by at least as much as his opportunity cost.  When the hourly in-
crease in his fee drops below his opportunity cost, he would do better to settle and then to shift
his efforts to other matters.”); see also Coffee, supra note 50, at 686 (“The key point is that the
litigation stakes are asymmetric, with the defendant focusing on the judgment or settlement and
the plaintiff’s attorney focusing on the fee, which is typically a declining percentage of the recov-
ery.”); Dam, supra note 52, at 57 (“The plaintiff’s financial interest is in his share of the total
recovery less what may be awarded to counsel, simpliciter; counsel’s financial interest is in the
amount of the award to him less the time and effort needed to produce it.” (quoting Saylor v.
Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972))); Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25
J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 509 (1996) (“As is well known, the lawyer who owns only a fractional
interest in the claim will invest less in the claim than someone who owns the entire claim.”).
64. See Coffee, supra note 50, at 688–89 (mapping attorneys’ investment incentives); see also
Macey & Miller, supra note 62, at 25 (“Attorneys compensated on a percentage method have an
incentive to settle early for an amount lower than what might be obtained by further efforts.
The attorney who puts in relatively few hours to obtain an early settlement is likely to earn a
much greater compensation per hour of effort than an attorney who expends greater efforts and
litigates a case to the point where the plaintiffs’ recovery is maximized.” (footnote omitted)).
65. See Coffee, supra note 50, at 687 n.55, 689 fig.A (citing and discussing Clermont & Cur-
rivan, supra note 50, at 544).  The socially optimal investment point is somewhere between the
attorney’s and client’s preferred investment points. See id. at 689–90 (explaining that at the
socially optimal investment point, “any further expenditure of effort will involve marginal costs
greater than the marginal increment in the settlement’s size and hence will normally result in
social inefficiency (even if it is still in the client’s interest to continue the action, because the
client receives the marginal gains but does not incur the marginal costs)”).
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defendant’s explicit or tacit agreement to support (or at least not ob-
ject to) a higher fee.66
Cost investments suffer the same agency problems, but the effect is
even more pronounced.  First, because costs are not directly profita-
ble, and because the relationship of cost investment to any fee award
is unclear and muted, firms lose the incentive to pursue additional cost
investment at an earlier point than with regard to time investment.
That is so because the additional cost investment—which is unable to
generate direct profits—more quickly reaches the point where the
next unit of investment produces less of a return than could be earned
in another venture.  Second, class counsel is never more susceptible to
inducements to accept a sweetheart deal at the expense of class mem-
bers than when faced with a looming and substantial cost investment,
given that the return on money investment in litigation is so unappeal-
ing to the investing firm.
D. Summarizing Cost Effects
In sum, our current jurisprudence concerning fees and costs incen-
tivizes firms to invest in time but not costs.  This means that cost-in-
tensive cases are not pursued, that cost-effective measures are not
taken in pursuing the cases that are brought, and that counsel is likely
to settle a case on the eve of a large cost investment.  These three
outcomes are suboptimal from the class’s perspective—some classes
are never even formed because their claims are too cost heavy to pur-
sue, and other classes’ claims are litigated at too high a fee (or price)
or settled at too low a recovery.
IV. CORRECTING COST EFFECTS: COST PROFITS
A jurisprudence that rewards cost investments would begin to ame-
liorate the problems identified in the previous Part, thereby encourag-
ing firms to pursue cost-heavy cases and to do so in a manner that
better aligns with class members’ interests.  To achieve those goals,
courts would first have to identify mechanisms for enabling profits on
costs.  Toward this end, we identify four approaches to cost profits—
66. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fair-
ness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1987) (“The classic
agency cost problem in class actions involves the ‘sweetheart’ settlement, in which the plaintiff’s
attorney trades a high fee award for a low recovery.”); Hay, supra note 63, at 1436 (“The central
agency problem in class action settlements may be stated simply.  There is some amount of
money that the class members will recover, in expected terms, from the defendant if the case
goes to trial.  The defendant and the class counsel have a financial incentive to split that amount
between themselves by settling the case and giving the class members as little as possible.”).
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mark-to-market, cost-plus contracts, cost multipliers, and fee multipli-
ers for cost investments—and analyze their relative strengths and
weaknesses.
A. Mark-to-Market
A mark-to-market approach would provide firms with a market rate
for their cost investments, regardless of their actual costs.  The cate-
gory of cost investment where class counsel are most likely to experi-
ence a gap between their own costs and market rates is those costs
categorized as in-house services, such as copying.  If it costs a firm, for
example, three cents per page for copying, but the market rate at
Kinko’s is ten cents per page, the firm could charge ten cents per page.
This approach bridges some of the differential in fees and costs in
some situations (notably, with regard to in-house services), but does
little to address the problems with respect to investment in a more
significant cost category, disbursements to third parties.  Thus, as to
cases that are not brought because of their cost-heavy nature,67 the
mark-to-market approach provides little further incentive for invest-
ing in, say, an expert’s plume study because the “market rate” for
plume studies is likely to be precisely whatever class counsel already
pays and is reimbursed for in these cases.  Similarly, a mark-to-market
approach is unlikely to counter incentives to settle prematurely or
suboptimally as, on the eve of a large cost investment, a firm will not
alter its behavior if the investment (e.g., in experts for trial) will just
return the market rate paid to these experts.  Mark-to-market alone is
therefore insufficient to generate optimal cost investments in the most
troubling situations.
B. Cost-Plus
A fixed markup approach would enable firms to recover a fixed
profit, such as 10%, above their costs, through an ex ante arrangement
with the court made, for example, at the time interim class counsel is
appointed.68  This approximates a “cost-plus” approach to sales con-
tracts generally.
Like the mark-to-market approach, this bridges some of the differ-
ential between fees and costs in some situations by making cost invest-
ment at least competitive with nonlitigation investment.  However, the
cost-plus approach does not fully address the current regime’s dispro-
portionate rewarding of time versus cost investment.  That is, a 10%
67. See supra Part III.A.
68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3).
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across-the-board cost return makes cost investment more alluring
than, say, parking cash in a savings account, but it does not come close
to the direct profit available on time investment.  The cost-plus ap-
proach is thus unlikely to make cost-effective money investments—for
example, steering work to LPOs—more attractive than relatively cost-
ineffective (but profitable) investments of attorney time, as the
markup on the firm’s lodestar and the possibility of a multiplier will
likely outweigh the plus in the “cost-plus.”  Similarly, the cost-plus ap-
proach may move class counsel’s and class members’ preferred case-
investment points closer together, but will not fully bridge the gap,
because even with a direct cost profit, counsel’s stake in the litigation
outcome remains a fraction of the class’s stake.  Of course, in the cost-
plus approach, a lot turns on the quantity of the plus.  We return to
this point below, as it suffuses the following option as well.
C. Cost Multipliers
Courts could apply multipliers to cost investments that parallel mul-
tipliers currently awarded on time investment (lodestar)—if attorneys
are deserving of a 2 multiplier for their fees (that is, double their lode-
star), they would receive a 2 multiplier for their costs.  Cost multipli-
ers are just a version of cost-plus contracts with two distinctions.  First,
a cost-plus contract may be enacted ex ante while a cost multiplier is
awarded by a court ex post; this creates a greater risk for the investor
and hence requires a greater reward.69  Second, multipliers (in fee ju-
risprudence) tend to hover in the 1.5 range,70 whereas the term “cost-
plus” rarely imagines the plus being as high as 50%.
Cost multipliers appear at first glance to level the playing field be-
tween cost and time investments: if the multiplier were set at the same
level, one might think an investor should be indifferent between the
choices.  But looks may be deceiving.  This is so for two reasons: first,
because costs are often relatively small, a firm sensing a strong case
might want to invest heavily in that case and fees enable this in ways
costs do not; and second, as argued throughout this Article, fee multi-
pliers are often icing in that the lodestar itself embodies a profit.71
69. That is, 100% certainty of a 10% markup equals 1.1 (1 × 1.1), while to generate that return
with only a 60% chance of recovery, the promised markup/multiplier would need to be 83% or
1.83 (.6 × 1.83).
70. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 272 tbl.14 (mean multiplier 1.81); see also Fitzpat-
rick, supra note 29, at 833–34 (mean multiplier 1.65).
71. The first of these two factors—the higher numbers on the fee side—is somewhat of a
fudge as it does not describe any differential treatment of costs and fees; however, it captures the
fact that there is generally more opportunity to profit from fees in a given case than there are
opportunities to profit from costs.  This privileging of fee investments should be offset by the
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Cost multipliers cannot level the field unless they, too, employ both a
markup and a multiplier.  Table 4 demonstrates the point by using the
same hypothetical data from Table 3 but adding in a cost multiplier
equal to the fee multiplier.
TABLE 4: COSTS AND RETURNS ON LAWYERS VS. LPOS
(WITH COST AND FEE MULTIPLIERS SET AT 2)
Option 1 – LPO Option 2 – Option 3 –
Contract Attorney Staff Attorney
Cost to Firm $25,000 Flat fee $25,000 $50,000
+ (1,000 hours at (1,000 hours at
$5,000 attorney time $25 per hour) $50 per hour)
(100 hours at $50
per hour)
= $30,000
Costs Billed to $25,000 $0 $0
Class (2 multiplier) × 2
= $50,000
Lawyer Billed to $65,000 $450,000 $650,000
Class (2 multiplier) (100 × $325 × 2) (1000 × $225 × 2) (1000 × $325 × 2)
Total Paid by Class $115,000 $450,000 $650,000
Net Profit $85,000 $425,000 $600,000
Table 4 shows that with a cost multiplier, the profit in using the
LPO goes from the $60,000 it was in Table 3 (with no cost multiplier)
to $85,000 (with the cost multiplier).  While that is a 42% increase in
profit, the LPO profit still pales in comparison to the firm’s profit
were it to use a contract or in-house attorney because of (1) the higher
numbers on the fee side and (2) the profit already built into the lode-
star.  While it is true that the firm has to risk more money to make the
fee profit, its risks are muted by the lodestar-profit effect—a risk-
averse firm can invest in contract attorneys and for a lower investment
($25,000 as opposed to $30,000) realize a far greater return ($450,000
rather than $65,000) than the firm investing in an LPO.  A firm willing
to put $50,000 into a staff attorney—which may have collateral bene-
fits, or else firms would always hire contract attorneys—could up the
total of its return to $650,000.  Our model therefore predicts that even
with direct cost profits, firms may not invest in more cost-effective
LPOs but may instead move toward contract or staff attorneys.  This
intuition tracks current practice pretty well.  To get firms to invest in
risk—the more a firm invests in the case, the greater its downside should it lose.  But the lodestar
markup counters that risk rather significantly in how it doubly rewards the fee investments.
2014] PROFIT FOR COSTS 611
costs, something beyond cost multipliers themselves may be
necessary.
As with the other forms of cost profits we have examined, a cost
multiplier also goes part of the way to more closely aligning the inter-
ests of class counsel and the class in terms of the level of case invest-
ment and the timing of settlement; however, because the combined
fee and cost award is still always a fraction of the overall recovery for
the class, class counsel’s and the class members’ asymmetric litigation
stakes will still require courts to guard against self-seeking behavior
by class counsel regarding the timing and amount of settlements.
D. Fee Multipliers for Cost Investments
A fourth approach to rewarding cost investments would be to en-
able fees to be multiplied if a firm could demonstrate a significant in-
vestment in costs.  This approach would harness the lodestar-profit
effect that privileges time investments in the first place and attach that
effect to cost investments.
Interestingly, practice slouches in this direction in two ways.  First,
lawyers in private practice who negotiate arrangements for jointly
pursuing cases often build into their contracts a fee reward to the in-
vestor firm that outstrips the size of the investment itself and reflects
the intuition that a higher share of the fee is the only way to reward
the cost investment.72  Second, as discussed above,73 fee jurisprudence
identifies risk—which can often be cost investment—as a factor in re-
ward, including a multiplied reward.  Both of these practices are cur-
rently fairly marginalized, however.  Rewarding cost investors with
fees immediately runs into two ethical hurdles: (1) fees can only be
shared among lawyers, so the market of potential cost investors is lim-
ited; and (2) in many jurisdictions, fees can only be shared relative to
the services rendered, with few ethics rules or allocating courts consid-
ering or giving much weight to the cost investment itself as a service.
Rewarding a single firm’s cost investments by augmenting its multi-
plier is but a crude current practice because there is scant jurispru-
dence on what it means to make a meaningful cost investment.
Moreover, this approach would, hand-in-hand with encouraging cost
investments, simultaneously encourage firms to run up their lodestar,
as the latter is the basis for what will be multiplied due to the former.
72. See supra notes 39–49 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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V. GETTING STARTED CORRECTING COST EFFECTS
While none of the methods described in the preceding Part will
eradicate the bias against cost investments in class action lawsuits, ef-
fectuation of any of them would begin to soften the negative effects of
that bias.  In the following subparts, we recommend steps that courts
could begin to consider and examine some of the potential downsides
of those effects.
A. First Steps
We recommend that courts consider some or all of the following
measures, all of which are doctrinally feasible under current fee and
cost doctrine:
• At the outset of class action lawsuits, if courts are discussing fee
structures with class counsel, they should explicitly advise coun-
sel that investment in costs that benefit the class will be
rewarded.
• As fee multipliers currently reward risks, including the risk of
cost investments, there is already a toehold in current doctrine
for cost profits, albeit indirectly.  To strengthen this practice,
courts should develop a fee jurisprudence that focuses more in-
tently on the risk factor for fee multipliers and takes seriously
the extent to which cost investments ought to trigger fee multi-
pliers.  Counsel that can demonstrate to courts that particular
cost investments benefited the class ought to be presumptively
rewarded for that with some fee multiplier.  If courts extract this
part of the fee equation and discuss it more explicitly, a jurispru-
dence will develop that begins to explicate particular types of
cost investments warranting fee multipliers, and that will in turn
have a more meaningful impact on attorney case investment
decisions.
• Alternatively, courts should consider rewarding costs directly
with cost markups and multipliers.  Such rewards would be more
defensible under current ethics doctrine if counsel advises the
class representatives and court of the need for them in particular
cases at the outset of those cases and secures that approval ex
ante.  And of course any cost reward would have to be reasona-
ble in size and ensure that the class’s total payout for fees and
costs does not become unreasonable.  Thus, for example, if a
cost is rewarded directly, there might be no reason to award a
fee multiplier for the same cost investment—and the same risk.
• Ethics rules on fee sharing among lawyers should more clearly
and expressly permit the division among counsel to rely on both
time and cost investment, without privileging time investment.
Relatedly, courts should understand the value of private ar-
rangements among counsel that reward costs and deem such
contracts presumptively enforceable—or at least not presump-
tively unenforceable.
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• Courts and ethics counsel should consider easing the restrictions,
if any, that might prohibit counsel from sharing cost profits with
nonlawyers.  If any of our proposals for directly rewarding costs
were put into practice, such cost profits ought to attract inves-
tors.  There is no strong reason for limiting investment in costs
to lawyers alone given that cost investors would likely not con-
trol a significant enough piece of a case to skew counsel’s incen-
tives away from the class’s best interests.
These steps are culled from our initial overview of the available mech-
anisms to reward costs.  As such, they are a first thought experiment
in need of refinement and development over time.  Nonetheless, they
identify ways in which the legal system might provide access to more
justice for litigants in high-cost situations.
B. Potential Problems
As with all new ideas, effectuating changes in fee and cost struc-
tures runs the risk of creating perverse incentives, incentives that
weaken the strength of the suggestions we make in this Article.  We
preliminarily note several potential concerns our suggestions raise and
identify some ways that these negative consequences might be
contained.
First, we argued above that the most effective means of rewarding
cost investments is to enable a fee multiplier for such investments.
Yet this recommendation immediately has a perverse effect: counsel,
aware that their cost investments will trigger a fee multiplier, now
have yet another incentive to run up their lodestar.  Courts using costs
as a basis for fee multipliers need to guard against this outcome, per-
haps by checking the total lodestar more closely and comparing it to
similar cases.  That said, we are aware that courts often lack the time
or ability to engage in this level of lodestar micro managing.  It might
therefore require more of a long-term, scholarly, empirical analysis to
see if the introduction of fee multipliers for cost investments leads to
significant upticks in lodestars.
Second, if courts were to penalize cost investments that were poorly
made using a negative cost multiplier—as they occasionally apply neg-
ative fee multipliers—this might discourage investment in costs and
counter our efforts to encourage such investments in certain cases.
This is not to say that negative cost multipliers would never be war-
ranted, simply that they provide a complicating factor to this analysis.
Third, by creating a new investment center for lawsuits, our propos-
als trigger two conventional ethical and policy concerns: (1) that such
investment opportunities will not create a more optimal array of case
types but will create over-litigation and (2) that cost investors will
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wield too much control of individual litigation decisions.  There is a
rich literature on both of these points that we need not replay here,74
but courts will obviously need to be wary of these problems should
they start down the paths we propose.
Fourth, as with all new ideas—particularly those involving lawyers’
incentives—there will surely be a range of unintended consequences
of our proposals, consequences we cannot therefore identify.75  That
of course suggests that there be periodic reassessments of any moves
in this direction or possibly time-limited trial runs with various sugges-
tions in particular jurisdictions to see how they work in practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Law firm partners make a profit by charging their associates’ time
at higher rates than they pay their associates and, in class action cases,
by occasionally realizing a multiple of their lodestar to reward the risk
they took in pursuing the case on a contingent fee basis.  It is these
profits that attract lawyers to pursue plaintiff-side law practices.  Legal
doctrine enables these rewards precisely to encourage lawyers to do
just that, as such lawyers supplement public law enforcement as pri-
vate attorneys general.
Our current jurisprudence, however, skews the incentives of private
attorneys general by rewarding their time investments more directly
and generously than their cost investments.  That disparity discour-
ages private attorneys general from investing in cost-intensive cases,
from staffing cases most efficiently, and from settling cases at optimal
points.
This Article has described those skewed effects and provided a se-
ries of initial recommendations to attempt to correct them.  Our goal
74. See, e.g., STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE
UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 28 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf (“[S]ome have argued that
availability of ALF will increase the number of lawsuits filed or, synonymously, increase the
‘quantity’ or ‘volume’ of litigation.”); id. at 18 (“[S]ome have raised concerns that ALF will lead
ALF suppliers to influence decisions by claimants and their lawyers in inappropriate ways.”);
ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 17–26
(2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/
20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.authcheckdam.pdf (re-
viewing potential ethical problems associated with ALF, including conflicts and interference
with the attorney’s independent judgment).
75. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was widely seen as
aimed at breaking the grip of certain firms, including most notably Milberg Weiss, but had as one
unintended consequence the effect of increasing the position of that very firm in securities litiga-
tion. See, e.g., A. A. Sommer, Jr., Preempting Unintended Consequences, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1997, at 231, 231.
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has been not just to describe and prescribe, but to suggest that our
justice system is falling short of its ideals to the extent that its costs
jurisprudence discourages the filing and optimal pursuit of meritori-
ous, but high-cost, lawsuits.
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